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McInerney: McInerney on Hollywood

Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of
History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. xv + 371 pp. ISBN 0226349527
(paper).
Reviewed by Maud McInerney, Haverford College
Amy Hollywood's Sensible Ecstasy is a challenging, provocative, original and occasionally
frustrating book that considers the complex relationship between mysticism and sexual
difference in the work of a series of important modern and postmodern French thinkers. The
tenor of French intellectual life in the twentieth century has been, for the most part, resolutely
secular, even anti-religious; Hollywood demonstrates, however, a profound fascination on the
part of Georges Bataille, Simone de Beauvoir, Jacques Lacan and Luce Irigaray not only with
Christian mysticism but with particular forms of bodily devotional practice associated with
medieval women. She argues that the medieval past (itself abjected, dismissed as a gap between
more meaningful historical eras, intimately and inevitably implicated in the excesses and failures
of religiosity), has been instrumental in shaping several major impulses in Western philosophy
and psychoanalysis. Trained as a medievalist (her previous book, The Soul as Virgin Wife:
Mechthild of Magdeburg, Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart, deals with the links between
gender and apophatic mystical traditions in the late Middle Ages), Hollywood does not read
medieval women writers through the lens of contemporary critical theory, but rather uses the
texts of medieval and early modern women writers such as Angela of Foligno, Beatrice of
Nazareth, Hadewijch of Brabant, Marguerite Porete and Teresa of Avila to read the works of
Bataille, Beauvoir, Lacan and Irigaray, especially with reference to their understanding of the
links between the body, sexual difference, and subjectivity.
Sensible Ecstasy is divided into three parts: "Georges Bataille, Mystique," "(En)gendering
Mysticism," which is devoted to Beauvoir and Lacan, and "Feminism, Mysticism, and Belief,"
which develops an extended reading and critique of the issue of belief in the work of Luce
Irigaray. At its best (and the best parts are parts one and three), the book invites an exhilarating
re-engagement with the work of the thinkers, both medieval and modern, who are its subjects.
For Hollywood, the central link between medieval female mystics and twentieth century French
theorists is their shared investment in apophatic modes of speech. The distinction between
cataphatic and apophatic modes of mystical communication in the Christian tradition goes back
at least as far as Augustine; briefly put, the cataphatic tradition is visionary, celebratory, and
insists upon the ability of words to serve as signs pointing toward divine truth, even if they must
always fail to be identical with it. The apophatic mode of mystical speech, on the other hand,
assumes the ultimate futility of language, embracing absence and paradox in the place of
meaning, and thus anticipating many of the currents of twentieth century poststructuralist
thought.
The first part of Sensible Ecstasy, devoted to a reading of the mystical in Georges Bataille, is
especially provocative. Bataille has never been a particularly important figure in American
feminist theory; this may be due to his explicit investment in the sacred (which he places in
uneasy opposition to the religious in Atheological Summa), or to his sadism (practical?
theoretical?). Hollywood is very good at unpacking the implications of Bataille's antireligious,
bodily mysticism, less good at confronting the issue of sadism in his work. She is particularly
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concerned to rescue Bataille from the charge leveled at him by Sartre in 1943: that his mysticism
(what Sartre called his "black pantheism") amounted to escapism, to a rejection of history and its
ethical and political imperatives. Hollywood argues that Bataille does not "desire to escape
history and temporality but to engage with them differently" (35). He thus embarks upon a
complex and not always consistent attempt to subvert a whole series of binary oppositions: "For
Bataille, the contradiction between objective and subjective, like that between the fictional and
the autobiographical, allows his theoretical texts themselves to become 'operations' of ecstasy;
they continually erect and overturn distinctions between 'experience' and 'theory,' 'subjective' and
'objective,' 'inner' and 'outer,' making the writing of theory itself an erotic, mystical, religious
exercise" (59). Hollywood makes this claim in reference to Bataille's putatively autobiographical
Story of the Eye and his (in)famous meditation in the Atheological Summa on the photograph of a
mutilated Chinese torture victim. She argues that both of these texts operate to produce "what
Lacan would call jouissance, an ecstasy that goes beyond, dissolving the subject and those
secondary formations of subjectivity--masochism and sadism--that attempt to protect it" (57).
For Bataille, violence is philosophically essential to a notion of sacrifice separate from religious
practice, but in the face of the global historical trauma of the Second World War, literal sacrifice
becomes impossible; writing pain thus becomes the only possible response to history, rather than
an evasion of it.
Bataille's fascination with physical suffering and abjection finds a reflection in Angela of
Foligno's Book of Visions, which he was reading as the war began. Angela was a thirteenth
century Franciscan tertiary whose devotional practice included not only fasting but much more
abject behavior, such as eating the scabs of lepers. Hollywood claims that what Bataille finds in
Angela is a perfectly apophatic religion which maps onto his own ontological quest: "The God of
the mystics, Bataille suggests, is a God without aim, project, salvation, or knowledge--hence not
God at all, at least as that concept is deployed within the mainstream of Christian theology and
philosophy" (67). For both the twentieth-century philosopher and the thirteenth-century mystic,
meditation on pain is a way of dissolving subjectivity by inducing a constructed traumatic
experience. Hollywood argues persuasively that, where actual trauma victims need
"narrativization, through which bodily memories are relived and reordered in meaningful
narrative forms" (76), Angela and Bataille, like other medieval mystics, reverse the process,
"moving through narrative memory in order, through imaginative recreation, to induce sensory
and emotive suffering and horror in the face of catastrophic loss" (77). Bataille's meditation on
torture victims functions, according to this argument, to "intensify and embrace guilt-ridden
anguish" (79) in response to the atrocities of mid-century. For Hollywood, this becomes an ethics
of catastrophe, an imperative to communicate what is, by definition, incommunicable: "Bataille
desires to live within death's breath; he is compelled to witness (to) the other's physical
dissolution, through which the chance nature of existence is made known" (87).
Hollywood explicitly acknowledges many of the problems in her reading of Bataille as a sort of
ethical philosopher of sado-masochism. She ends the part of the book devoted to him with a brief
comparison to a contemporary whose experience of atrocity was intimate rather than secondary,
Simone Weil. Hollywood insists that "unlike Weil, Bataille refuses to believe in a loving, torturer
God through whose sacrifice history will be redeemed" (110). She sees this refusal as profoundly
ethical, which indeed it may be. Nonetheless, Hollywood's attempt to rescue Bataille from the
charges made by Sartre (and Beauvoir, and implicitly others) is ironic on several different levels,
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not least because it attempts the redemption of a thinker who rejected the very notion of
redemption. This makes Hollywood's project seem quixotic in much the same way as Angela
Carter's "Polemical Preface" to The Sadeian Woman, in which Carter argued that the Marquis De
Sade was actually the ultimate feminist.
There is a great deal to be admired in Hollywood's reading of Bataille (as in Carter's of De Sade)
but some major elisions and erasures ought to provoke us to question it more fully. For one
thing, Hollywood's summary of the plot of Story of the Eye sanitizes it significantly. The narrator
and Simone "stage a drunken orgy with other local youth, during which they sexually manipulate
Marcelle," Hollywood remarks primly (47). In Bataille's text, the scene in question goes on for
three pages and is obscenely explicit in its descriptions of intercourse, masturbation, fellatio,
urolagnia, and a variety of other sexual practices, some of which defy labeling; the violence of
the novel is equally explicit, and indeed the English translation has been the constant subject of
attempts at censorship. Hollywood's paraphrase and her citation of the reflections of the second
narrator rather than of the Story itself, distance the author (Bataille), the critic (Hollywood), and
finally the reader from the most characteristic quality of the text, its extreme and obscene sadism.
This distancing is partly deliberate; Hollywood concentrates, for the most part, on the
masochistic impulses she sees as characteristic of both Angela of Foligno and Bataille, and
which she links to practices (of devotion, of writing) which both communicate and control the
trauma of loss through death. Angela is not, however, the only medieval figure with whom
Bataille identified. His fascination with Gilles de Rais, sadist, necrophile, rapist and murderer of
hundreds of children, troubles Hollywood's thesis profoundly, and indeed, Gilles haunts her
footnotes and her epilogue rather as though he were the repressed struggling to return. There is a
significant difference between Bataille's imaginative identification with the Chinese torture
victim, which Hollywood is able to read as a form of bearing witness to the suffering of another,
and his treatment of Gilles. Bataille published the documents surrounding Gilles's inquisition in
1965 as Le Procès de Gilles de Rais, and his interest lies not with the young victims of atrocity,
but with Gilles himself as the manifestation of a perverted Catholic impulse toward sacrifice,
ritual and excess. There are, no doubt, ways of negotiating this paradox in Bataille's thought; I
wish Hollywood had attempted them. She notes, in her critique of Bataille's investment in his
own "ecstatic anguish," that "it is not clear that who suffers is so radically contingent . . .
differences in race, class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity make it more likely that members of
one or another particular group will be the subject of physical torture" (95), but she herself seems
almost to participate in this elision by repressing the victims (disadvantaged by class, by age, by
history itself) of Gilles de Rais.
The second part of the book, "(En)gendering Mysticism," deals with Simone de Beauvoir and
Jacques Lacan. In it, Hollywood's focus shifts from the status of the body in mystical and
philosophical discourse to the question of gender. The mystical, she argues, is problematic for
Beauvoir, who is both aware of its appeal, which she experienced directly during her devout
Catholic childhood, and deeply suspicious of it. Beauvoir insists that women have been
culturally constituted as the "Second Sex." Given such acculturation, mysticism has historically
been one of the few avenues of self-expression open to women; but for Beauvoir, it is usually a
blind alley (and indeed, this is how she, along with Sartre, understood Bataille's mysticism). In
her fundamentally experiential and political worldview, mysticism can only succeed when it
becomes active, fully engaged with the social world; Beauvoir sees this as happening only in the
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lives of a very few extraordinary women: Catherine of Siena, Joan of Arc, and especially Teresa
of Avila. The experience of other religious women such as Marguerite-Marie Alacoque, the
initiator of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, or Madame Guyon, is assimilated by Beauvoir to
hysteria; in them, mysticism becomes an obstacle to agency rather than a vehicle for it. Teresa,
by contrast, transcends the weakness and passivity associated with femininity through her
mysticism, controls the effects of that mysticism through the power of the will, and thus becomes
"an existentialist hero for whom the force of her will in the face of death is sufficient to generate
meaning, value and projects" (144).
Hollywood argues both that Beauvoir's "critique of femininity contains within it an explicit
critique of masculinity" (139) and that her failure to historicize Teresa suggests a continuing
desire for transcendence even after Beauvoir has decided that mysticism is a temptation to be
avoided. According to this reading, it is the very cultural instability (impossibility?) of the
feminine subject position that drives Beauvoir to engage in a more complex manner than her
male contemporaries with both death and the absolute. Paradoxically, this ambivalent desire for
subjection to some notion of the absolute operates to free Beauvoir from "dependence on the
contingent recognition of others . . . who, all too often, fail her" (145).
Coming after her elaborate and impassioned reading of Bataille, Hollywood's treatment of
Beauvoir seems a bit flat, and is rather repetitive, both substantially and on the level of
sentences: "Teresa is the great exception" (132) to the general association of mysticism with
narcissism; "Teresa is, for Beauvoir, the great exception" (143) to women's inability to take
responsibility for themselves. One wonders whether this flatness is not perhaps due to the
absence of the defensive zeal that characterizes Hollywood's enthusiastic attempt to recuperate
Bataille. Beauvoir, after all, is not in need of rescue in quite the same way. The second subject of
part two, Jacques Lacan, doesn't come in for the rescue treatment either; Hollywood is more
critical of Lacan than of any other figure in the book, and not only for his well-known antifeminism.
Hollywood's discussion of Lacan centers upon the analogic positions, in his work, of the
feminine and the apophatic. In the Lacanian universe, "mysticism, as a quest for the absolute . . .
encounters instead that which radically destabilizes subjectivity and meaning--mysticism seeks
the transcendental signifier but discovers the paradoxical interplay of presence and absence
through which signification is made possible" (149). Mystical absence functions in much the
same way as "woman" for Lacan; as he puts it in Seminar XX: Encore, "there is always
something in her which escapes discourse" (cited by Hollywood, 155). Hollywood notes that
"Lacan's arguments are emphatically not grounded in a conception of women's 'nature' and its
greater proximity to the 'mystical'"(151). Instead, she argues, sexual difference is for Lacan a
function of language as it operates within the phallocentric system. "Woman," the mystical, and
the phallus are all symbolic sites upon which the male fantasy of castration and loss can be
projected in order to support the myth of male primacy and power. Thus in Lacan's writing a
notorious series of disarticulations (between women and "Woman," between the a and the A,
between penis and phallus) mirror the disarticulation between cataphatic and apophatic language.
While Lacan's version of psychoanalysis is generally associated with scientific or pseudoscientific modes of discourse (equations that look like algebra, diagrams that look like
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geometry), Hollywood redirects our attention to Lacan's own interest in mysticism: "Lacan not
only wants his audience to read mystical texts, but counts his own writings among them" (163).
Hollywood paints a compelling picture of a sort of mystical anxiety of influence motivating the
most self-dramatically egotistical of the French psychoanalysts. Behind Lacan, appropriated
and/or erased to greater or lesser degrees, stands a series of shadowy mystics: Hadewijch of
Anvers, a Beguine whose mystical texts Lacan recommends, Teresa, who appears only as her
statue by Bernini, and finally Bataille, who goes nearly completely unacknowledged but whose
influence, Hollywood argues, is profound (the weirdly intimate personal connections between
the two men, who were married to the same woman almost simultaneously at one point, are
traced in a series of footnotes (321-22). The evocation of the mystical is linked for Lacan to the
concept of jouissance, which Hollywood describes as an "anguished ecstasy in which the real,
the recognition of the endless gap in being and the ceaselessness of desire, emerges" (166).
Hollywood argues, however, that for Lacan, far more than for Bataille, this ecstasy is
dehistoricized and depoliticized. For Lacan, lack becomes so theoretical that it stops looking like
death, thus avoiding the messy physicality so present in Bataille's work. Even more
problematically, as Lacan works to expose the phantasmatic quality of phallic logic (according to
which subjectivity is founded upon the separation between the "object a" and the "A/Other," a
separation which becomes confused or conflated with the equally crucial separations between
femme and la femme and between penis and phallus), he reinscribes it: "as long as Lacan
continues to use the language of castration, lack and paternity to name the gap in the subject, he
continues to privilege masculinity and to uphold the very fantasy his work sets out to subvert"
(168). For Lacan, as for Bataille, "we are all always already castrated, lacking, lacerated and
split," even while "a fantasy of fullness and phallic plenitude is inscribed within this very
account of subjectivity" (170). The difference between the two, Hollywood implies, is that
Bataille at least attempts some confrontation with bodily rather than merely psychoanalytic
trauma, with the ultimate loss that is death. Lacan's elegantly theoretical, even mathematical,
formulations of loss operate to veil the obstreperous reality of suffering which so engaged the
imagination of Bataille.
Just as Bataille stands (albeit unacknowledged) behind so much of Lacan's thought, Hollywood
argues that Lacan himself is the influence against whom the Belgian philosopher Luce Irigaray
struggles to reorient a psychoanalytic understanding of mysticism, sexual difference and death.
In the chapters devoted to Irigaray, Hollywood's writing reclaims the defensive enthusiasm that
characterized the first part of the book, on Bataille. (To be quite fair, some of the infelicities of
style in the Lacan chapter may be due to the subject matter; perhaps it is simply impossible to
write about Lacan without using the tired phrase "always already" six or seven times.) In the case
of Irigaray, Hollywood undertakes to defend her from the charge of essentialism so often leveled
at her by other (and especially American) feminists, and develops a reading that is rigorous,
critical and yet at the same time admiring. Hollywood tracks the development of Irigaray's
thoughts on mysticism over several decades and a series of influential texts, with particular
emphasis on the chapter in Speculum de l'autre femme called Lamystérique, and the essays "Così
fan tutti," "Belief Itself" and "Divine Women."
In general, it is the Irigaray of the earlier texts whom Hollywood finds most convincing. It is also
in Speculum that Irigaray comes closest to late medieval women mystics as she argues that the
feminized body of Christ allows a rare space for the development (albeit always abortive) of a
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feminine imaginary within the male-dominated Western tradition. The image of the mirror itself
(speculum in Latin), Hollywood reminds us, derives from the Christian mystical tradition and
permits Irigaray to argue "both that women have served as the empty, passive surface in which
men have seen themselves reflected, and that this mirror . . . can reflect men's words and images
back with a difference. This subtle subversion marks the difference that is femininity within
male-dominant society" (195). The emphasis on the body, on mystic touching (perhaps
metaphorical, perhaps not), also links Irigaray to the Beguine mystics. She "understands
language as caught in a logic of vision and representation that rests on the repression of touch, of
embodiment, and so, she argues, of women" (196). It is from this position that Irigaray mounts
her critique of Lacan, arguing that his "emphasis on castration, lack and wounding creates a
rhetoric of impotence that a feminine imaginary must challenge" (203). For Irigaray, however,
the Christian mystical tradition is insufficient to disrupt the mechanisms of male domination. As
Hollywood puts it, "although the Incarnation may be the grounds for a new relation to language,
the Christ of traditional Christianity does not save women but usurps their power, creativity and
bodiliness through his feminized body" (205). She thus calls for the invention of a feminine
divine which would arise from the deconstruction of male-dominated philosophies and permit
the imagination of a fully empowered women's subjectivity.
At this point, Hollywood argues persuasively, Irigaray's project runs into two difficulties. The
first is related to her understanding of the way gendered religious symbols work, and the second
to her unquestioning acceptance of Feuerbachian presumptions of belief. As the work of Caroline
Walker Bynum demonstrates, the mechanics of identification do not operate according to gender
lines; St John of the Cross and St Bernard of Clairvaux are perfectly able to imagine themselves
as feminized by love of Christ, while female religious are no more likely than men to identify
with feminine avatars of the divine (Christ as mother, the Virgin Mary, Divine Wisdom as
Sophia). There is no space in Irigaray's resolutely heterosexist vision of the universe for such
cross-gendered identification. A further problem is raised by archeological evidence; it is by no
means clear that women enjoyed greater social power in pre-Christian cultures that still had
goddesses. In fact, many historians of religion have argued that the advent of Christianity
permitted women to play a far more important and visible role in religion than had been possible
in the Judaic or pagan Mediterranean. Irigaray's utopian vision of the feminine divine arises,
Hollywood argues, from an "apparently uncritical acceptance of the Feuerbachian claim that
religion is a projection and reflection of the ego ideals of its human creators" (211). While
Feuerbach's critique of formal religion was enormously influential in the mid-nineteenth century,
more recent scholarship has complicated the picture significantly, complications which Irigaray
chooses to ignore.
Underlying this more or less willful ignorance of the way religion and religious symbols actually
operate, Hollywood argues, is an even deeper problem in Irigaray's thought, the "fetishization" of
sexual difference. Irigaray has regularly been accused of essentialism, of linking identity
absolutely to bodily morphology: women are defined by their vaginas, men by their penises.
Hollywood insists that this is to oversimplify the case. Rather, what Irigaray does is to fetishize
sexual difference as the ground upon which the separation between men and women, which she
sees as the fundamental schism in human society (an analysis challenged and often rejected
outright by third-wave feminists, who argue for the equal importance of race and class
difference); for Hollywood, fetishization is a more apt term than essentialism because it
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describes a more complicated psychological process. Fetishism, after all, is about control, about
the projection of fear (fear of death, fear of loss) onto a figure or concept which is other than the
fetishizing subject; fetishized concepts in Irigaray include natality and maternity, both of which
allow her to imagine a feminine divine which is entirely concerned with possibility, with
creativity and potential rather than with loss or death. Paradoxically, Hollywood argues, it is the
fetishization of sexual difference which allows Irigaray to deny "much of the particularity,
specificity, and multiplicity of bodily experience, which includes both pleasure and suffering,
possibility and loss, natality and mortality" (269). Hollywood demonstrates the way this process
operates by elaborating parallel readings of the reception of Irigaray and the Beguine Beatrice of
Nazareth. She argues that Irigaray is misread by her critics just as Beatrice (who was both the
author of a mystical text, the Seven Manners of Loving, and the subject of a male-authored
hagiography) was by her biographer. Both sorts of misreading are related to the body--thus the
claim that Irigaray essentializes gender is based upon a literalization of the complex metaphorics
of her thought, just as Beatrice's hagiographer anchors her spiritual experience in her body in
ways which her first person account does not. Both also, Hollywood argues, point to unresolved
issues in the texts of the two women. Beatrice's hagiographer needs to invoke her suffering,
hysterical body both in order to make sense of what she represses in her own account of her
spiritual experience, and in order to repress his own corporeality, which is projected (as was so
often the case in medieval religious writing) onto hers. Similarly, while Irigaray may not
essentialize in the simplistic fashion of which she has been accused, by grounding women's
experience absolutely in the female body, she does "fetishize sexual difference in response to the
absence of women's autonomy and freedom" (267)--which becomes a way of refusing to deal
with the realities of loss, of suffering, of death.
It is, finally, the question of loss which lies at the heart of Hollywood's book and which
motivates its most ambitious claims and its most trenchant critiques. Angela of Foligno can
confront loss because it is balanced by the transcendent presence (albeit only momentary) of a
Christ who is to her utterly real; Bataille confronts it without the guarantee of the divine, which
drives him to value suffering in an exclusive fashion that urges his logic "dangerously close to
that of the serial killer" (276). Beauvoir, Lacan, Irigaray: all, according to Hollywood's account,
fail in some significant manner to deal with the problem of loss, of mortality. "We are left," she
writes in the conclusion, "with the problem of how to acknowledge trauma and loss and allow for
mourning and recognition of its bodily effects without forcing women and other oppressed
people to bear the weight of this work through their symbolic association with the mortal body,
and without succumbing to a valorization of trauma as the sole site of the real" (277). How this is
to be done remains (necessarily!) unresolved. Hollywood's book, however, does operate to
confront and make restitution for one very particular kind of loss; it recuperates the influence of
the medieval past and of medieval women in particular on a powerful current in modern and
postmodern philosophy. The impulse to rescue difficult ideologies (such as those of Bataille and
Irigaray) will resonate profoundly with medievalists; this is, of course, what we do: we rescue
fragments of the past from misconstructions based upon misrepresentation, we re-present
difficult ideologies by freeing them from reductive generalizations. By removing Angela of
Foligno, Hadewijch of Brabant, Teresa of Avila, Marguerite Porete and Beatrice of Nazareth
from the marginal category of medieval women mystics in which they have so long resided and
reinstating them as precursors of a powerful current in contemporary philosophy, Hollywood
performs a major reconfiguration of the way we understand the Western intellectual tradition.
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